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Will Kymlicka, "Multinational Federalism in Canada: Rethinking the Partnership" The author aims to clarify how minorities who have defined themselves as nations, such as Quebecers and First Nations, can be recognized within the federal structure. He points out that English Canadians have adhered to a "territorial" conception of federalism while French Canadians have adopted a multinational vision of federalism whereby the constituent elements are first and foremost peoples, rather than regional units. His paper argues that the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords indicates that this difference can no longer be "papered over": "the only remaining question is whether English-speaking Canadians can be persuaded to accept the multination conception of federalism." Guy Laforest, "Se placer dans les souliers de l’autre dans l’Union canadienne" The author analyzes the diversity of Canada’s constituent elements from the perspective of a "trilateral union of partnerships." According to this vision, the Canadian Union can accommodate different forms of partnership simultaneously (and asymmetrically); between federated provinces, between the distinct societies that are Canada and Quebec, and between the Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians. He shows how the notion of partnership has a legitimate place in the history of Canadian federalism, although what he refers to as the "central government’s imperial temptation" has consistently blocked its functioning. Recognition of each other’s different identities is fundamental to making a partnership work. Kenneth Norrie and Michael Percy, "The Economic Dimensions of a Canada Quebec Partnership" The authors argue that outside of the current federal institutional context, the only partnership option with Quebec that would make sense for Canada would be dual membership in NAFTA. The complexity of negotiating a new relationship in the turbulent context of Quebec secession would render Canada more likely to opt for "off-the-shelf" arrangements than new ones, and common membership in NAFTA would have the additional advantage of minimizing the potential disruption to external trade. NAFTA as a framework for the economic union is compared to the regime currently in place under the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT). The conclusion is that NAFTA would provide effective enough integration that a further bilateral partnership is unlikely to be necessary. François Rocher, "Partenariat économique et intégration politique" The author advocates the relatively simple model of a bilateral Quebec-Canada treaty, as opposed to more complex confederal models resembling the European Community or the partnership proposal advanced by the Yes campaign in the 1995 Quebec referendum. He provides a detailed analysis of the drawbacks of the European model, and rejects the 1995 Yes proposal in light of the European experience. He prefers the example of the Benelux Economic Union, which "illustrates that a close economic union is entirely possible between two sovereign countries" without a supranational structure. David Schneiderman, "Reconstructing Rights in the Spirit of a New Partnership" The author argues that the Canadian Charter of Rights, the Quebec Charter and Aboriginal rights instruments could be made compatible and constitutionalized in a regime of "multiple charters." He analyzes the opposition to the Canadian Charter which has been expressed by Quebec and Aboriginal leaders as springing more from its having been imposed without their consent than from hostility to the values it protects. He calls for a new version of rights constitutionalism based upon consent and mutual recognition. His paper realistically details the intricacies of constitutionalizing multiple rights regimes, including amendments necessary for harmonizing the various rights regimes. Kenneth McRoberts, "Linguistic Minorities in a Canada Quebec Partnership" The author addresses the concern that a reconfigured partnership between the two dominant linguistic groups would leave linguistic minorities "out in the cold." The apprehensions of the two linguistic minority groups, McRoberts recognizes, could seriously compromise the possibility of a new Canada-Quebec partnership. "Within the nations of Canada and Quebec," McRoberts notes, "there would be a strong disposition that a single language be the official language." His preferred protection for linguistic minorities is that of reciprocal accords by which the two national governments jointly commit to observe common undertakings regarding their minorities. Thus, minority linguistic rights would be "one of the elements of partnership." Presuming that New Brunswick would maintain its constitutionalized minority language rights in the event of a new partnership, the main accord that would be required would be between Ontario and Quebec, which are home to 77 percent of Canada’s official language minorities. Jane Jenson, "Distinct Societies, Citizenship Regimes and Partnership" The author argues that two divergent political identities have been created respectively in Quebec and Canada. She analyzes this divergence in three dimensions of citizenship: citizenship as the conferring of rights, as the feeling of belonging to a particular community and as the capacity to make claims via access to political power. She finds a widening gap between Canada and Quebec on all three scores, and argues that the failure to recognize that the citizenship regimes of Quebec and Canada are not the same has led to a "dialogue of the deaf" between them. Jenson sees asymmetrical federalism as the solution for reconciling the existing citizenship regimes (including that of Aboriginal peoples), provided that it is accepted that "a single country may house a variety of collective projects without threatening either the country’s existence or the well-being of its members," and that "loyalties do not need to be hierarchically arranged in order to be loyalties." Alain Noël, "Le principe fédéral, la solidarité et le partenariat" The author examines the criteria that could underpin a new partnership in the field of social policies. Weighing the principles of subsidiarity and of federalism, Noël highlights the opposition between them, noting that "subsidiarity distorts the rules of the federal game by assessing the division of powers in terms of results." For Noël, the federal principle -- allowing the constituent parties autonomy in their areas of jurisdiction -- better corresponds to the nature of Canadian society and to the political imperatives of an association between peoples. He is sceptical of partnerships based on co-decision, preferring the greater local autonomy of a rigorously respected federal system, with external solidarity coming through policy harmonization and convergence. Roger Gibbins, "Models for a Canada Quebec Partnership" The author argues that confederal forms of partnership, which give more autonomy to the partners than conventional federalism, are most likely to provide a durable and mutually attractive solution to the national unity impasse. However, an institutional reconfiguration of English Canada would be necessary to create a single partner, a complex and uncertain process which is not inherently attractive to Canadians. Gibbins argues that the Canadian partner would only be interested in such an arrangement if it guaranteed Canada autonomy from Quebec: "the notion of a Canada-Quebec partnership in which the Quebec partner would enjoy autonomy while Quebec politicians would continue to shape the Canadian partner is a non-starter." The amount of common space assigned to the partnership may determine which institutional framework makes sense, Gibbins notes. One element Gibbins envisages is a reformed upper chamber, bringing together provincially appointed delegations in an intergovernmental House of the Provinces. Réjean Pelletier, "Les arrangements institutionnels d’un nouveau partenariat canadien" The author examines the potential of Senate reform in a new partnership. He examines four alternative scenarios for partnership: a confederal Quebec-Canada union along the lines proposed by the PQ; a radically reconfigured confederal Canada of five regions, in which a Partnership Council would manage joint jurisdictions; a redefined federalism uniting five strong regions, which would enjoy wide powers consistent with the principles of subsidiarity and asymmetry, with a reformed Senate playing an enhanced role in representing their interests in the partnership; lastly, a new federalism of the provinces in which subsidiarity, asymmetry and co-decision principles are strengthened and the Senate replaced by an intergovernmental Council of the Federation made up of ministers or first ministers. Pelletier sees the fourth option as the most realistic in the current context, although he recognizes that it would represent a significant shift in power away from the federal government. Daniel Latouche, "La projection internationale d’un partenariat Canada Québec" The author notes that "Canada and Quebec have only rarely behaved as partners on the international stage." In his view, it is difficult to imagine how English Canada could be brought to consider such a shift without a referendum win by the Yes side. Latouche formulates the hypothesis that the greater the degree of involvement of the international community in subsequent partnership negotiations -- which he believes is foreseeable, for example, concerning the rights of Aboriginal peoples, linguistic minorities within Quebec, shipping on the St. Lawrence and air transport, and participation in military alliances -- the greater will be the scope of the international partnership between Canada and Quebec. In addition, the partnership could be given international responsibility for areas of jurisdiction placed in common at the domestic level. Still other international activities, Latouche posits, may emerge out of values which the partners share and on which they may wish to cooperate voluntarily. Ronald Watts, "International Examples of Political Partnerships" Two characteristics common to confederal models leads the author to prefer a federal system for Canada. First, confederal systems have tended to be politically unstable in the long term. Second, confederal models tend to make decision making difficult by giving each partner a veto. International experience shows that either model is less workable where there are only two constituent partners, because of the zero-sum dynamic. Roger Gibbins and Guy Laforest, "Finding a Way Out of Our Constitutional Impasse" The authors call for a more open and constructive dialogue, and for mutual concessions, between sovereignists and federalists, and, in particular, between the Chretien and Bouchard governments. They recommend the establishment of a constituent assembly to give Canada a new constitution that would then be ratified through popular referendums. Matthew W. Barrett, "Meeting our Economic Objectives Together" The primary drivers of structural change in our economy are technology, economic policy and demographics. These drivers have brought rapid changes in industrial and organizational structures and marked shifts in the demand for labour skills. To meet these challenges Canada must have an appropriate policy structure that encourages investment in human and physical capital and facilitates the efficient allocation of resources. To realize our potential, we must also settle this constitutional issue that has been haunting us for over 20 years. |
