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2005 LaFontaine-Baldwin lecture: "Libérer du besoin, de la charité à la justice" by Louise Arbour In this exerpt from the speech she gave on the sixth annual LaFontaine-Baldwin Symposium, Louise Arbour examines the ideas and values on which the international human rights system is based and the role that Canada has played in its development. She also attempts to explain and invites us to overcome “our enduring reluctance to make economic, social and cultural rights a reality.” "The decline and irrelevance of Canada's political parties" by Robin V. Sears The Liberal and Conservative policy conventions, held within two weeks of each other in March, turned out to be positioning statements before the spring showdown of the minority Parliament in April and May. Neither party could have anticipated the explosive testimony before the Gomery Commission, yet both were struggling to minimize their internal divisions, the Liberals trying to halt a drift to the left, while the Conservatives tried to move closer to the centre from the right. In all of this, contributing writer Robin Sears senses that all political parties in Canada are challenged by declining participation rates, even as they inflate their membership numbers during leadership campaigns and riding nomination races, to levels seen only rarely before, in political formations such as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "La visite du président Bush en Europe : quelles leçons, pour qui ?" by Marie Bernard-Meunier In going to Europe, President Bush was trying to “turn the page on Iraq and acknowledge that, in its battle for liberty and democracy, the United States needs Europe,” writes Marie Bernard-Meunier. It is a mission accomplished, she states. At every stage, he wanted to please — in France as well as in Germany — even though he remained closed on certain issues, notably NATO’s role, the embargo on arms to China, and Iran. Despite all this, transatlantic relations are still plagued by significant divergences in opinion and misunderstandings. The former Canadian ambassador to Germany analyzes this visit by the US president and the implications for Canada. "Defending the United States and Canada, in North America and abroad" by John J. Noble From Franklin Roosevelt’s Queen’s University address of 1938, the mutual defence of Canada and the United States has been the central tenet of Canadian foreign and defence policies. With rare exceptions, notably John Diefenbaker’s reneging on accepting nuclear Bomarc missiles in 1963, the policy of mutual defence has been adhered to by every Canadian government since Mackenzie King’s in the 1940s. Paul Martin’s decision not to participate in ballistic missile defence can be seen as a break with that tradition. John Noble, both a student and practitioner of Canada-US relations, looks back at Canada-US defence policy, from the end of the Second World War and the creation of NATO and NORAD, to the end of the Cold War and the present realities of the post 9/11 world. While he regards BMD “as a high-tech Maginot Line,” he also writes that once the US “decided to proceed with BMD we should have supported it.” "Muddling through on missile defence: the politics of indecision" by David Rudd Prime Minister Martin’s decision that Canada would not participate with the United States in North American missile defence was driven by his priority of gaining a parliamentary majority, and particularly by his hopes of re-gaining seats in Quebec, where opposition to ballistic missile defence is strongest. The prime minister’s February 24 announcement was also timed by his need to pre-empt a youth resolution opposing BMD that would have carried at the Liberal convention the very next week. “The decision not to embrace BMD as a matter of national and continental importance,” writes David Rudd, “should therefore be viewed as one determined by party politics rather than an appreciation of the strategic landscape.” Politics, not policy, drove the entire process — the politics of indecision. "Canada and North American maritime security: the home and away game at sea" by Joel J. Sokolsky During the Cold War, the maritime defence of North America began “over there” in the waters off Europe and Asia, writes Joel Sokolsky. Much the same approach has been apparent in the war on terrorism, in taking it to them “over there.” “As in the Cold War” he observes, “these actions and policies have an impact upon Canada and its security ties with the United States.” While it is unclear what the framework of enhanced Canada-US maritime cooperation will be, the imperative of defending the North American coastline is clear. "All Quebec's fault, again? Quebec public opinion and Canada's rejection of missile defence" by Pierre Martin What is the extent of the difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada on missile defence? How can we account for this difference? Was Quebec’s negative assessment of Canada’s participation the determining factor in Ottawa's decision? Pierre Martin asks these pertinent question on Quebec’s fervent opposition to missile defence — the highest of any region of the country. Where Quebec had won the favour of continentalists and invoked the wrath of Canadian nationalists by massively supporting the Free Trade Agreement in 1988, it has invoked the displeasure of continentalists and won the favour of nationalists by its opposition to missile defence. Blame it on Quebec — again. "When politics trumps security: a Washington vantage point" by David T. Jones The process, no less than the substance, of Canada’s decision not to participate in North American missile defence has left many in Washington puzzled, writes former US diplomat David Jones, by “the relentlessly maladroit manner in which Prime Minister Martin and the Liberals address what is supposedly their most important foreign policy topic: the bilateral relationship with the United States.” While Paul Martin had already made the decision by the time of the NATO summit on February 21, he did not bother to inform President Bush, when he could easily have taken him aside for a few minutes in Brussels. Even as the government had taken its decision, the ambassador-designate to the US, Frank McKenna, was telling a parliamentary committee that Canada was part of the missile defence shield, and then, on his arrival in Washington the following week, publicly linked the decision to trade irritants, only to be contradicted again by the prime minister. But beyond the bungled process, what are the larger implications for continental defence, and the conduct of bilateral relations? "National missile defence: a wise decision for the moment" by Julian Schofield and Ara Karaboghossian After Pierre Trudeau, who chose not to engage Canada in Safeguard in 1969, and Brian Mulroney, who decided not to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1985, Paul Martin’s refusal to participate in US continental missile defence is the third such rejection. Julian Schofield and Ara Karaboghossian review the reasons why this decision is a sensible one for now. First, anticipation of contracts for the Canadian defence industry are exaggerated. Second, the issue is highly ideological and rooted in US domestic politics, and the program itself is driven by technology rather than clear policy. Third, by too close an association with the principal agents of missile defence, Canada risks damage to its reputation that could handicap other multilateral foreign policy objectives. But, they conclude, Martin’s decision has not resolved the issue definitively: “The promise of hit-to-kill technology, the nature of China’s emerging trans-Pacific threat to the US, and the maturation of other theatre missile programs such as MEADS suggest that this decision will be revisited within the next decade.” "From Kabul to Konduz: lessons for Canadian reconstruction of Afghanistan" by Sean M. Maloney Canadian forces in Afghanistan have been based at Camp Julien, and their mission as part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been to enhance security and stability in the capital, Kabul, where the government, as Sean Maloney writes, “has evolved over three years from a transitional government, to an interim government, to an elected government.” However, the Canadian deployment is now shifting from the capital to the provinces, and provincial capitals such as Konduz, where provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have a much more dangerous assignment in the reomote areas of the country. “There is nothing mystical about PRTs” writes Maloney, a professor at Royal Military College, “but there is a lot of mythology and wishful thinking in the current discussion of them.” From a recent tour of the area, he offers a ground-level view. "Nationalism left and right" by Joseph Heath [summary not available] "More to space than rocket science: Canada's civilian space program" by Denis Legacey Canada is justly proud of its expertise in robotics, notably the Canadarm in space, and in communications satellites going back to the 1960s, not to mention the country’s pride in its astronauts, from Marc Garneau to Julie Payette. Now head of the Canadian Space Agency, Garneau points out in an interview with writer Denis Legacey that Canada’s space program is not only underfunded, but it is simply not a priority in Ottawa. It is, Garneau tells Legacey, “a very difficult task to sensitize” Ottawa’s decision-makers to the importance of the space program. The space agency is nothing more than a $300 million line item in the Industry Canada budget. And in the 2005 budget, which projects a 50 percent increase in government spending in five years, the space agency isn’t even mentioned. One hopeful sign, however, is the appointment by Prime Minister Martin of a national science adviser. Book Excerpt: Getting It Done by Derek H. Burney With the clock ticking toward midnight and a Congressional deadline to negotiate a free trade agreement between the United States and Canada, US Treasury Secretary James Baker burst into his own boardroom and announced the vital concession on Canada’s deal breaker — a dispute settlement mechanism. Only two days earlier, Derek Burney had led a Canadian delegation to Washington to inform the Reagan administration that “the deal we wanted, we do not see; the one we see, we do not want.” As chief of staff to Prime Minister Mulroney, he played a critical role in breaking the deadlock, resulting in the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. Later, as ambassador to the United States from 1989 to 1993, he was equally involved in the NAFTA negotiations in Washington in 1992. In this exclusive excerpt adapted from his memoir, Getting It Done, Burney takes readers inside the room in the tense final days of the free trade talks in October 1987. Book Review: Paul D. Frazer reviews Getting It Done by Derek H. Burney [summary not available] "Sinistrose" by Alain Noël [summary not available] |
